Debunking Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba’s Arguments Against So-Called “Defeatism”
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What he smears as “delusional defeatism” is simple pragmatism whose time has come after the counteroffensive’s failure proved to be an inflection point, while his side’s hopes for maximum victory over Russia are what’s really delusional and also dangerous.
Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba just published an article at Foreign Affairs about how “There Is a Path to Victory in Ukraine: The Delusions and Dangers of Defeatist Voices in the West”. It was released as the conflict finally begins winding down, which prompted panic from Western policymakers since they didn’t have a Plan B if the counteroffensive failed. Barring a false flag provocation like the one that Belarus warned that Poland is plotting, a “land-for-peace” deal might be inevitable by sometime next year.
Zelensky’s regime is doing everything in its power to prevent that from happening since he and his ilk know that it’ll bring about the end of their political careers, ergo why he tasked his top diplomat with pushing back against so-called “defeatist voices in the West” in his latest article. This is a desperate last-ditch attempt to artificially prolong the conflict after they read the writing on the wall. For as hard as he tries, however, Kuleba can’t manage to make any compelling arguments.
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As is typical of Ukrainian officials, he began by fearmongering about the consequences of anything other than a maximum Ukrainian victory, which falls flat after being repeated so many times already. He then acknowledges growing skepticism about this scenario before claiming that it’s still “militarily feasible as long as three factors are in place: adequate military aid…the rapid development of industrial capacity” in the West and Ukraine, and “a principled and realistic approach” to negotiations with Russia.
The next part of his piece detailed his side’s successes in order to dispel perceptions that the over $200 billion in aid given to Ukraine thus far has been for naught. Kuleba then claims that freezing the conflict will only lead to another one, which might by then even result in Russia attacking NATO members, before arguing that aid to Ukraine isn’t “charity”. Finally, he concludes by drawing comparisons to setbacks after the Normandy landing, after which he reiterates that victory is just as inevitable now as it was back then.
Instead of coming off as confident, Kuleba exudes despair, which he unconvincingly tried to disguise with regular references to maximum victory over Russia. He wouldn’t have written his article if there wasn’t palpable fear in Kiev that the West is seriously considering washing its hands of this failed proxy war. They apparently decided that the only possible way to prevent this from happening is to double down on the World War III fearmongering while hyping up future profits for the military-industrial complex.
This explains why Ukraine’s top diplomat took a page from his side’s predictable playbook regarding the first and then focused on the second in two of his three prerequisites for victory, with the latter echoing the emerging narrative spewed by the US’ Secretaries of Defense and State in recent days. As for the third one regarding a “a principled and realistic approach” to negotiations with Russia, this was clearly made due to reports over the weeks that the West is pressuring Ukraine to recommence such talks.
Foreign Minister Lavrov revealed on Friday that “a number of high-level, well-known leaders of Western countries, including one specific Western leader, a very well-known one, several times… at least via three different channels of communication, sent signals as to why don’t we meet and talk about what to do with Ukraine and with European security.” This came a day after President Putin pledged to fulfill the demilitarization, denazification, and neutrality goals of the special operation by force or diplomacy.
Back in mid-June, “Putin Strongly Suggested That A Political Solution To The Proxy War Is Still Possible”, which readers can learn more about from the preceding hyperlinked analysis. The counteroffensive’s failure increased the West’s interest in recommencing peace talks, ergo why former NATO Supreme Commander Admiral Stavridis published his “land-for-peace” proposal in early November, which is informally aimed at preventing a possible Russian breakthrough as it prepares for a new offensive.
While the promise of more profits for the military-industrial complex is always an enticing prospect from the perspective of Western policymakers, few appear interested in risking their side’s on-the-ground gains in this conflict by artificially prolonging hostilities just for a few elites to make a few more bucks. That’s not to say that this scenario should be completely ruled out, especially since Austin and Blinken are pushing precisely these arguments nowadays, but just that this appeal has recently lost its luster.
The counteroffensive’s failure was a game-changer since literally tens of billions of dollars’ worth of taxpayer funds were invested in one of the most hyped-up campaigns in modern history with nothing to show for it except for “Russia now control[ing] nearly 200 square miles more territory in Ukraine”. This disastrous and literally counterproductive outcome makes it politically difficult to sell the policy of continued aid to the Western public, and no amount of blabbering from Kuleba is going to change that.
It’s therefore not so-called “defeatism” for average folks and their elected officials to debate “face-saving” and pragmatic exit strategies from this debacle that preserve their side’s on-the-ground gains that cost over $200 billion to achieve instead of risking their total loss by carrying on like Kuleba wants. His regime has self-interested stakes in artificially prolonging the conflict since their careers are on the line if it ends with anything other than maximum victory over Russia, but others’ stakes are different.
Military leaders don’t want to risk a larger conflict by miscalculation if Russia achieves a breakthrough and they’re consequently ordered to conventionally intervene in Ukraine out of desperation to draw a “red line” that preserves the abovementioned gains under those fast-moving circumstances. Meanwhile, political ones don’t want to risk voters’ wrath during the next election by continuing to waste their hard-earned taxes on this doomed conflict. Exceptions of course exist, but this is the state of play right now.
The convergence of these military and political dynamics will likely lead to Kuleba’s appeal falling on deaf ears and only reverberating around the echo chambers of likeminded warmongers with similarly ulterior motives for artificially prolonging this proxy war. What he smears as “delusional defeatism” is simple pragmatism whose time has come after the counteroffensive’s failure proved to be an inflection point, while his side’s hopes for maximum victory over Russia are what’s really delusional and also dangerous.
